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I．Crisis reinforces need for stronger trade and financial
integration in Asia and the Pacific
By Mia Mikic and Ravi Ratnayake
Introduction
The Asian economies have become an epitome of “trade as an engine of growth”
during  the past several  decades as  they have  been expanding  economic  and  human
development,  using  trade  as  a  ladder.   Most  of the economies have  become highly
integrated  into  the  world  economy,  either  through  direct  export  and  import  or  by
becoming an important link in the global supply chain. However, when demand for their
production and exports plunged suddenly and sharply in the last quarter of 2008, a sharp
contraction in trade flows put their growth and social security under serious threat. On
such occasions, issues  of  dependency  on  external  markets,  foreign  exchange, foreign
direct investment  (FDI)  and technology rise  to  the  surface  and  chosen  development
strategies get reviewed. In Asia and the Pacific, this is accompanied by the concerns
about  the  inability  of  the  region’s  economies to enhance and  deepen their  regional
integration. Expectedly, the latest crisis has accentuated the concerns about low levels of
existing intraregional  trade  and  investments as  well  as underdeveloped  financial
integration in Asia and the Pacific.
This e-book brings together chapters that explore various aspects of trade and
financial integration in Asia and the Pacific, the reasons for the lack of it, and potential
benefits  of  strengthening  such  integration.  The book focuses  on the exploration  of
challenges  and  opportunities  that  exist  in  intraregional trade in  goods, integration  in
services trade, availability of trade finance as well as inflows of portfolio investments.
The papers have been written by researchers who have applied their extensive expertise
and  analytical  skills  to studying  the impacts  of regional trade  liberalization  and
motivations for financial flows.
A. Asia and the Pacific: A highly heterogeneous region…
For the purpose of this e-book, the Asian and Pacific region comprises 58 regional
members and associate members of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP).
1 Ranging from Turkey in the west to Pacific island States in the
east, and from the Russian Federation in the north to New Zealand in the south, it can be
expected that the region includes extremes on all ends. In terms of population size, the
three most populous nations (China, India and Indonesia) share the concerns of regional
integration with Niue, Nauru and Tuvalu that together have less than 25,000 inhabitants.
1 For the full list of economies included see the ESCAP website at www.unescap.org/about/member.asp.2
The region encompasses the nations that belong to the “rich club” with a gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita of more than US$ 50,000
2 as well as nations whose
per capita GDP hardly reaches US$ 200. In terms of size of trade, there are mini-sized
trading nations with less than US$ 10 million of merchandise exports and nations that are
contributing sizeable shares to world exports, e.g., China at 9.3 per cent, Japan at 5 per
cent and the Russian Federation at 3 per cent (table 1). In terms of import and export
dependence, Asia-Pacific averages 27.5 per cent for merchandise import dependence and
29.5 per cent for export dependence, making the region more trade dependent than the
world average. This average hides the very high values of merchandise trade dependence
for small open economies such as Maldives (only on the import side), Nauru, Singapore
and  Hong  Kong,  China,  or  relatively  low  values  for  economies  with  large  domestic
markets, such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan and the Russian Federation (table 2).







Top five economies (percentage share in world)
1 China 7.10 1 China 9.23
2 Japan 4.78 2 Japan 5.05
3 Republic of Korea 2.73 3 Russian Federation 3.02
4 Hong Kong, China 2.46 4 Republic of Korea 2.73
5 Singapore 2.01 5 Hong Kong, China 2.39
Bottom five economies (percentage share in world)
44 Micronesia (F.S.)* 0.00056 42 Palau 0.00019
45 Palau 0.00037 43 Vanuatu 0.00019
46 Nauru 0.00027 44 Micronesia (F.S.)* 0.00018
47 Niue 0.00019 45 Niue 0.00006
48 Tuvalu 0.00017 46 Tonga 0.00005
Memo items
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Pacific 1.51 Pacific 1.45
Source: Calculations by ESCAP, based on COMTRADE data.
* Federated States.
2 In 1990 constant United States dollars.3







Top five economies (percentage share in GDP)
1 Marshall Islands 2 571.29 1 Marshall Islands 748.69
2
Hong Kong, China 182.30 2 Singapore 185.87
3 Nauru 177.67 3 Hong Kong, China 171.76
4 Singapore 175.76 4 Nauru 160.07
5 Maldives 110.10 5 Azerbaijan 103.24
Bottom five economies (percentage share in GDP)
43
Iran (Islamic Rep.
of) 17.96 40 Armenia 8.84
44 Russian Federation 15.93 41 Vanuatu 5.89
45 Japan 15.53 42 Afghanistan 4.58
46 Azerbaijan 15.48
43 French Polynesia 4.37
47
Brunei Darussalam 14.61 44 Tonga 3.19
Memo items



















Source: Calculated by ESCAP, based on COMTRADE data.
B. …But most economies follow the ‘outward-oriented’ strategies
Notwithstanding  these  large  differences between  the  economies in  the  region,
most of them have, over a longer period, consistently relied on export (trade) to power
their growth; Japan was followed by newly-industrialized economies (Republic of Korea,
Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  China  and  Taiwan  Province  of  China)  and  newly  emerging
economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).  Their economic vitality and
successes in maintaining high economic growth rates, together with improving levels of
inequalities  and  poverty  reduction,  have offered  an  excellent  argument  in  favour  of
outward-oriented development strategies based on liberal trade and investment regimes as
well as high reliance on trade and FDI (World Bank, 1993).
While the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 brought some corrections in terms of
management of capital account openness, the ability of the then crisis-hit economies to4
“export themselves out of the crisis” only enforced the importance of trade and current
account  openness  for  their  development.  Despite  the  weakening  of the  Washington
consensus  conditionalities  after  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  most  Asian  and Pacific
economies continued to pursue outward-oriented strategies with two additional twists.
First, those affected by the financial crisis understood the value of sound current
accounts, robust foreign exchange reserves, and appropriate capital account controls and
foreign exchange rate management. In the decade after the Asian financial crisis, Asian
economies increased their holdings of foreign exchange reserves by five times, and some
of them became extremely important sources for financing the spending-savings gap in
the United States and some economies in the European Union. At the same time, pressure
on several Asian economies to appreciate their currencies in terms of the United States
dollar and the euro prior to 2008 did cause some movements in the exchange rates, but
relative competitiveness among the Asian economies has been preserved by managing
these  movements  carefully. Most  of  the  economies  maintain  de  facto  regimes  of
adjustable pegs and are not shy of using reserves to defend their currency values aligned
with their national goals.
Since the late 1990s, most economies, especially those that were hurt badly by the
financial  crisis, have reduced  their exposure  to  short-term  debt; nevertheless, some
economies did experience increased exposure just before the onset of the new global
crisis (e.g., Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation). However,
while  improvements have  been made  at the national  level,  the  lack  of  progress  in
financial market integration in Asia and the Pacific is still very obvious.
3 The key reasons
for  this  relative  failure  are (a)  the  absence  of  any  linkage  between  jurisdictions  of
financial infrastructure, and (b) very weak cooperation in financial market development,
including standards, supervision and intermediation (Bank of International Settlement,
2008).
Second,  most  economies  developed  strong enthusiasm for preferential  trade
agreements. Of 114 trade agreements that have been put into force and notified to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2000, 51 had at least one party from the Asia-
Pacific  region  (figure  1).
4 The  region  also  has  11 plurilateral trade  agreements that
connect countries in the same geographical region; these agreements more or less overlap
with subregions such as Central Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia, the Pacific etc.
5 Most
of these bilateral and regional agreements seek improvement of market access over and
above the ones secured through multilateral trading agreements.
6  It is thus somewhat
disappointing  that  while  the  intraregional  trade by Asia-Pacific  economies  has  been
steadily increasing in United States dollar terms, as a share of their total trade it has been
lingering at around 50 per cent since the end of 2003, up from 45 per cent in 1998.
3 Hyun Suk and Jang Hong Bum (2008) provide a review of cooperation efforts for bond market development in the
region with the focus on the Asian Bond Market Initiative (supply side), Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific
Central Banks (demand side) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (regional safety network).
4 The list of and details on each one of these agreements is available on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Agreement Database website at www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad.
5 Africa is home to seven regional trade and financial integrations.
6 Obviously, a number of agreements also pursue other economic and non-economic objectives.5
Compared with the 70-plus per cent achieved among the European Union economies, or
the 55-plus  per  cent  among  the North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement economies,
intraregional trade of Asia-Pacific would be considered as low if these economies had an
agreement similar to what has been linking European or North American economies.
Instead, the Asia-Pacific region economies form a “noodle bowl”.
7




























































































New agreements (LHS) Cumulative (RHS)
Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreement Database.
C. Crisis and ‘revival’ of the efforts to reach regional integration
As stated above, exports and imports dwindled as the recession took hold in the
major importing developed markets in the latter part of 2008 and early 2009. Figure 2
tracks year-on-year changes of monthly values of imports by selected Asian economies
since 1996 in order to compare three episodes of import contraction: 1997/98, 2001 and
2008/09. The  recent  contraction  of  imports  (measured  by  the  year-on-year changes),
which happened suddenly, was synchronized over all economies.
8 The magnitude of the
imports contraction, at between 20 per cent and 40 per cent, in the current crisis is larger
than the contraction recorded in the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and certainly deeper
than in the dot.com crisis.
7 This term is frequently used in the Asia-Pacific context to describe the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon of the tangle
of relationships created by multiple overlapping preferential trading arrangements. The term “spaghetti bowl” was
introduced by Jagdish Bhagwati in the early 1990s.
8 Exports behaved in the same way. See ESCAP, 2009 (part I).6
Since June 2009, there have been signs of a rebound of exports and imports as
well as a return to positive changes in real GDP and industrial production in a number of
countries in the region, including China and India. These positive changes should not,
however,  be taken as an indication of a return of dynamic economic and trade growth as
experienced during 2006-2008; it is more likely that the recovery of the global economy
will take a much slower route. Furthermore, there is a growing consensus that pre-crisis
trade and macroeconomic imbalances contributed to the crises and can cause another one
if not talked in a more systematic way. This means that the sources of growth for the
outward-oriented economies need to be modified and balanced instead of relying only on
the demand in the developed markets. Since some of the economies in the region have
really small internal markets, the only option for them is intraregional trade.
Figure 2. Import trends for selected Asian economies (monthly values, year-on-year
changes, February 1996 to June 2009
Source: ESCAP, 2009.
The fact that intraregional trade in the Asian and Pacific region is perceived as
low (given the efforts at liberalizing trade flows within the region), is seen by analysts
and policymakers both as a part of the problem and a part of the solution in this current
crisis. The low level of intraregional trade has been interpreted as a sign of high exposure
to external risks (i.e., a contraction of the aggregate in developed markets). To a large
degree, this is correct – trade contraction has indeed been caused by the disappearance of
external  demand  in  the  developed  markets  (Baldwin,  ed.,  2009). The  low share  of
intraregional  trade is also  seen  as  a  solution. Expansion  of  demand  for  products
originating in the region –  that is, an increase in intraregional trade – can substitute for
the lack of demand in the developed markets, which may take some time to recover after
the crisis. While at the start of the downward cycle in 2008 some analysts believed that7
Asia was “decoupled” from the developed country markets and would not be affected by
the financial crisis in the United States and Europe, a consensus has now (almost) been
reached that full “decoupling” is not possible, and is even undesirable, and that enhancing
intraregional trade and investment should play a complementary role in the integration of
the Asian and the Pacific region into the global economy (ESCAP, 2009).
D. Impacts of further trade liberalization on Asia and the Pacific
Among the obstacles that limit faster growth of the share of Asian and Pacific
region countries in intraregional trade are obviously the ones that matter in times of crisis
and which are linked to the man-made obstacles in terms of barriers to trade. Trade is
influenced by both demand behaviour and supply capacity, but these typically take longer
to correct. Therefore, the focus in the short term should be on boosting intraregional trade
by eliminating the barriers that still exist, despite numerous preferential trade agreements
among Asian economies.
Two chapters in this publication explore the impacts of liberalizing intraregional
trade. Strutt (chapter II) uses the Global Trade Analysis Project model to consider how
beneficial greater intraregional trade in Asia-Pacific would be. Several different trade
liberalization  scenarios  are  modelled,  including  a  pan-Asia-Pacific  tariff  elimination,
ASEAN+6 tariff elimination and multilateral WTO trade liberalization. The scenarios
have been designed to explore some of the potential gains of switching from the Asian
“noodle bowl” type of intraregional trade arrangements to one driven by a single tariff-
reducing/eliminating trade agreement. It was not surprising to discover that an increase in
exports is proportional to the level of ambition for liberalization among all economies in
the region. However, such an export increase does not boost the welfare of the largest
economies in the region by as much as the WTO level of liberalization does, due to the
terms of trade effects being more favourable for them when liberalization is global.
Wadhwa (chapter III) examines some of the important aspects of intraregional
trade in South Asia as countries of that subregion are members of multiple preferential
regional and bilateral trade agreements. The paper tracks the trends and patterns in South
Asian  intraregional  trade, the comparative  advantages  of  major countries  in  the
subregion, trade complementarity between those countries, and the levels and product
coverage  of  intra-industry  trade  over  the past decade.  The  paper  shows  that  trade
complementarities among the South Asian countries, although still low, have improved
over time. In addition, the levels of intra-industry trade in this subregion are not  yet
significant. Nonetheless, the analysis of marginal intra-industry trade indicates that there
are a few product categories that have contributed significantly to the new trade flows
over the past decade. The region does have the potential for enhancing intraregional trade
in at least some sectors through vertical intra-industry trade among the member countries,
with India taking the lead in this regard.
While trade  agreements focus  on the creation  of additional market  access  (in
addition  to  the  one  obtained  through  WTO  and  unilateral  preferential  schemes),  the
byproduct  is  also  generation  of trade  diversion  for  countries  not  involved  in  the8
agreements. Raihan (chapter IV) investigates the impact of trade liberalization between
India and the European Union on low-income countries that currently enjoy preferences
in the European Union market relative to India. All the low-income economies under
consideration would experience a loss in welfare, and the welfare losses for the South
Asian countries would be much higher than for the other low-income economies in Asia
and  Africa.  Bangladesh  appears  to  experience the largest  loss  in  welfare  in  absolute
value, whereas the rest of South Asia would incur the largest loss in terms of share in
GDP. The welfare losses of these low-income economies are mainly driven by the loss in
terms of trade. However, in general, the extent of welfare loss in terms of share in GDP
for most of these countries is not very high. Most of these low-income countries would
also experience losses in real GDP and exports. The policy issue to be considered here is
whether rules  of  origin  that  exist  in  agreements  between  India  and  (most  of  the
considered) low-income countries, and between India and the European Union, could be
designed in such a way as to prevent these adverse terms of trade shocks.
While most of the trade growth for dynamic Asian economies has occurred in the
merchandise and manufacturing sectors, services is an important sector; however, the
latter sector is often overlooked as the driver of growth. Traditionally, services have been
seen  as  a  low  productivity  growth  sector;  however,  with the  recent advancement  of
information and communication technology (ITC) as a medium for delivering services,
the services sector is playing a dominant role in increasing productivity of other sectors,
services and goods alike. Another special feature of services trade is the type of barriers
used. In contrast to trade in goods, services trade is regulated mostly by “behind the
border” measures  that  belong  to  regulatory  and  liberalization  frameworks  and  it is
complicated to implement these measures on a discriminatory basis.
Nevertheless, as an increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements
include concessions in the services sector, Dee (chapter V) explores what behind-the-
border reforms in services and investment are best done through trade agreements. One
way  to  answer  this  question  is  to  think  of  trade  agreements  as  being  exercises  in
piecemeal  reform,  in  the  sense  that  they  provide  opportunities  for  reform,  but  in  a
constrained,  partial  manner.  The  key  policy  question  is  whether  countries  should
unreservedly take advantage of these opportunities, despite the constraints, or whether the
nature  of  the  constraints  should  temper  the  way  in  which  the  countries  go  about  the
reforms. Chapter IV first compares trade agreements, as exercises in piecemeal reform,
with other modes of liberalization, and then considers which particular reforms should be
included  in  trade  agreements.  It  develops  two  key  principles  of  piecemeal  reform  in
services and investment. The first is to look for sectors where trade barriers tend to add to
real  resource  costs. The second is to take  a broader view than that of just removing
discrimination  against  foreign  providers.  The  paper  concludes  with  some  general
guidance for trade negotiators and trade ministers.
E. Some aspects of regional financial integration in Asia and the Pacific
In examining the key factors leading to the collapse of trade with the last crisis in
2008, Baldwin (ed., 2009) finds that “global trade finance has not had a major impact on
trade flows”. The freezing of trade finance did not happen in all regions and, in general,9
where it did occur it was only a “moderate freeze”, according to the  authors of that
volume. In contrast, Duval and Liu (chapter VII) found that the threat of the higher costs
and limited availability of trade finance to some economies in the Asia-Pacific region
was significant. In fact, in their other recent empirical analysis (Liu and Duval, 2009),
they suggested that a 10 per cent decline in trade finance could lead to a US$ 129 billion
drop in total trade in developing Asia, representing 3.6 per cent of their total trade. To
overcome  the  adverse  impact  of  the lack  of  trade  finance, the  authors  suggested
improvements in the establishment of related institutions in many of the less developed
countries of Asia, together with more serious consideration being given to the options for
regional cooperation in order to reduce the trade finance capacity gap between countries
of the region.
It has been argued that financial integration in Asia is probably the weakest of all
the components of regional integration (goods, services, labour and capital). While the
goods, services and labour components could be larger and tighter, there is no denying
that they have already strengthened. It is also true that data on those aspects of regional
integration  are  more  readily  available  than  data  on  financial  integration,  including
bilateral FDI flows.
ESCAP, 2009 (part I) discusses the intraregional flows of FDI based on available data.
FDI inflows to Asia are expected to recover quickly following the current global crisis (figure 3),
and  most  FDI  destined  for  Thailand  and  Viet  Nam  is  expected  to  come  from  other  Asian
countries. In turn, Thailand and Viet Nam, similar to China and Hong Kong, China are becoming
valuable  sources  of  FDI for neighbouring  countries  such  as the Lao  People’s  Democratic
Republic and Cambodia. FDI among Asian countries accounts for almost half of the region’s total
FDI  inflows, with intra-Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  FDI  particularly
showing a rising trend. South-East Asia remains the main destination for Asian outward FDI
(UNCTAD,  2008).  Within  South-East  Asia,  Singapore  is  the  largest source  of outward FDI,
flowing mainly to other ASEAN countries, and particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
Figure 3. FDI inflows from Asia to selected developing countries
Source: For 2009 onwards, projections by the Economist Intelligence Unit online database, as cited in ESCAP,
2009.
The intraregional FDI flows appear to be rising, but their absolute level is still
relatively low. This is even truer for the intraregional movements of portfolio capital (see,
for example, Garcia-Herrero, Yang and Wooldridge, 2008). Most of the private traders1
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A. Asia and the Pacific: A highly heterogeneous region…
For the purpose of this e-book, the Asian and Pacific region comprises 58 regional
members and associate members of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP).
1 Ranging from Turkey in the west to Pacific island States in the
east, and from the Russian Federation in the north to New Zealand in the south, it can be
expected that the region includes extremes on all ends. In terms of population size, the
three most populous nations (China, India and Indonesia) share the concerns of regional
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The region encompasses the nations that belong to the “rich club” with a gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita of more than US$ 50,000
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per capita GDP hardly reaches US$ 200. In terms of size of trade, there are mini-sized
trading nations with less than US$ 10 million of merchandise exports and nations that are
contributing sizeable shares to world exports, e.g., China at 9.3 per cent, Japan at 5 per
cent and the Russian Federation at 3 per cent (table 1). In terms of import and export
dependence, Asia-Pacific averages 27.5 per cent for merchandise import dependence and
29.5 per cent for export dependence, making the region more trade dependent than the
world average. This average hides the very high values of merchandise trade dependence
for small open economies such as Maldives (only on the import side), Nauru, Singapore
and  Hong  Kong,  China,  or  relatively  low  values  for  economies  with  large  domestic
markets, such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan and the Russian Federation (table 2).
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B. …But most economies follow the ‘outward-oriented’ strategies
Notwithstanding  these  large  differences between  the  economies in  the  region,
most of them have, over a longer period, consistently relied on export (trade) to power
their growth; Japan was followed by newly-industrialized economies (Republic of Korea,
Singapore,  Hong  Kong,  China  and  Taiwan  Province  of  China)  and  newly  emerging
economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand).  Their economic vitality and
successes in maintaining high economic growth rates, together with improving levels of
inequalities  and  poverty  reduction,  have offered  an  excellent  argument  in  favour  of
outward-oriented development strategies based on liberal trade and investment regimes as
well as high reliance on trade and FDI (World Bank, 1993).
While the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 brought some corrections in terms of
management of capital account openness, the ability of the then crisis-hit economies to4
“export themselves out of the crisis” only enforced the importance of trade and current
account  openness  for  their  development.  Despite  the  weakening  of the  Washington
consensus  conditionalities  after  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  most  Asian  and Pacific
economies continued to pursue outward-oriented strategies with two additional twists.
First, those affected by the financial crisis understood the value of sound current
accounts, robust foreign exchange reserves, and appropriate capital account controls and
foreign exchange rate management. In the decade after the Asian financial crisis, Asian
economies increased their holdings of foreign exchange reserves by five times, and some
of them became extremely important sources for financing the spending-savings gap in
the United States and some economies in the European Union. At the same time, pressure
on several Asian economies to appreciate their currencies in terms of the United States
dollar and the euro prior to 2008 did cause some movements in the exchange rates, but
relative competitiveness among the Asian economies has been preserved by managing
these  movements  carefully. Most  of  the  economies  maintain  de  facto  regimes  of
adjustable pegs and are not shy of using reserves to defend their currency values aligned
with their national goals.
Since the late 1990s, most economies, especially those that were hurt badly by the
financial  crisis, have reduced  their exposure  to  short-term  debt; nevertheless, some
economies did experience increased exposure just before the onset of the new global
crisis (e.g., Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation). However,
while  improvements have  been made  at the national  level,  the  lack  of  progress  in
financial market integration in Asia and the Pacific is still very obvious.
3 The key reasons
for  this  relative  failure  are (a)  the  absence  of  any  linkage  between  jurisdictions  of
financial infrastructure, and (b) very weak cooperation in financial market development,
including standards, supervision and intermediation (Bank of International Settlement,
2008).
Second,  most  economies  developed  strong enthusiasm for preferential  trade
agreements. Of 114 trade agreements that have been put into force and notified to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2000, 51 had at least one party from the Asia-
Pacific  region  (figure  1).
4 The  region  also  has  11 plurilateral trade  agreements that
connect countries in the same geographical region; these agreements more or less overlap
with subregions such as Central Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia, the Pacific etc.
5 Most
of these bilateral and regional agreements seek improvement of market access over and
above the ones secured through multilateral trading agreements.
6  It is thus somewhat
disappointing  that  while  the  intraregional  trade by Asia-Pacific  economies  has  been
steadily increasing in United States dollar terms, as a share of their total trade it has been
lingering at around 50 per cent since the end of 2003, up from 45 per cent in 1998.
3 Hyun Suk and Jang Hong Bum (2008) provide a review of cooperation efforts for bond market development in the
region with the focus on the Asian Bond Market Initiative (supply side), Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific
Central Banks (demand side) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (regional safety network).
4 The list of and details on each one of these agreements is available on the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment
Agreement Database website at www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad.
5 Africa is home to seven regional trade and financial integrations.
6 Obviously, a number of agreements also pursue other economic and non-economic objectives.5
Compared with the 70-plus per cent achieved among the European Union economies, or
the 55-plus  per  cent  among  the North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement economies,
intraregional trade of Asia-Pacific would be considered as low if these economies had an
agreement similar to what has been linking European or North American economies.
Instead, the Asia-Pacific region economies form a “noodle bowl”.
7
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Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreement Database.
C. Crisis and ‘revival’ of the efforts to reach regional integration
As stated above, exports and imports dwindled as the recession took hold in the
major importing developed markets in the latter part of 2008 and early 2009. Figure 2
tracks year-on-year changes of monthly values of imports by selected Asian economies
since 1996 in order to compare three episodes of import contraction: 1997/98, 2001 and
2008/09. The  recent  contraction  of  imports  (measured  by  the  year-on-year changes),
which happened suddenly, was synchronized over all economies.
8 The magnitude of the
imports contraction, at between 20 per cent and 40 per cent, in the current crisis is larger
than the contraction recorded in the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 and certainly deeper
than in the dot.com crisis.
7 This term is frequently used in the Asia-Pacific context to describe the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon of the tangle
of relationships created by multiple overlapping preferential trading arrangements. The term “spaghetti bowl” was
introduced by Jagdish Bhagwati in the early 1990s.
8 Exports behaved in the same way. See ESCAP, 2009 (part I).6
Since June 2009, there have been signs of a rebound of exports and imports as
well as a return to positive changes in real GDP and industrial production in a number of
countries in the region, including China and India. These positive changes should not,
however,  be taken as an indication of a return of dynamic economic and trade growth as
experienced during 2006-2008; it is more likely that the recovery of the global economy
will take a much slower route. Furthermore, there is a growing consensus that pre-crisis
trade and macroeconomic imbalances contributed to the crises and can cause another one
if not talked in a more systematic way. This means that the sources of growth for the
outward-oriented economies need to be modified and balanced instead of relying only on
the demand in the developed markets. Since some of the economies in the region have
really small internal markets, the only option for them is intraregional trade.
Figure 2. Import trends for selected Asian economies (monthly values, year-on-year
changes, February 1996 to June 2009
Source: ESCAP, 2009.
The fact that intraregional trade in the Asian and Pacific region is perceived as
low (given the efforts at liberalizing trade flows within the region), is seen by analysts
and policymakers both as a part of the problem and a part of the solution in this current
crisis. The low level of intraregional trade has been interpreted as a sign of high exposure
to external risks (i.e., a contraction of the aggregate in developed markets). To a large
degree, this is correct – trade contraction has indeed been caused by the disappearance of
external  demand  in  the  developed  markets  (Baldwin,  ed.,  2009). The  low share  of
intraregional  trade is also  seen  as  a  solution. Expansion  of  demand  for  products
originating in the region –  that is, an increase in intraregional trade – can substitute for
the lack of demand in the developed markets, which may take some time to recover after
the crisis. While at the start of the downward cycle in 2008 some analysts believed that7
Asia was “decoupled” from the developed country markets and would not be affected by
the financial crisis in the United States and Europe, a consensus has now (almost) been
reached that full “decoupling” is not possible, and is even undesirable, and that enhancing
intraregional trade and investment should play a complementary role in the integration of
the Asian and the Pacific region into the global economy (ESCAP, 2009).
D. Impacts of further trade liberalization on Asia and the Pacific
Among the obstacles that limit faster growth of the share of Asian and Pacific
region countries in intraregional trade are obviously the ones that matter in times of crisis
and which are linked to the man-made obstacles in terms of barriers to trade. Trade is
influenced by both demand behaviour and supply capacity, but these typically take longer
to correct. Therefore, the focus in the short term should be on boosting intraregional trade
by eliminating the barriers that still exist, despite numerous preferential trade agreements
among Asian economies.
Two chapters in this publication explore the impacts of liberalizing intraregional
trade. Strutt (chapter II) uses the Global Trade Analysis Project model to consider how
beneficial greater intraregional trade in Asia-Pacific would be. Several different trade
liberalization  scenarios  are  modelled,  including  a  pan-Asia-Pacific  tariff  elimination,
ASEAN+6 tariff elimination and multilateral WTO trade liberalization. The scenarios
have been designed to explore some of the potential gains of switching from the Asian
“noodle bowl” type of intraregional trade arrangements to one driven by a single tariff-
reducing/eliminating trade agreement. It was not surprising to discover that an increase in
exports is proportional to the level of ambition for liberalization among all economies in
the region. However, such an export increase does not boost the welfare of the largest
economies in the region by as much as the WTO level of liberalization does, due to the
terms of trade effects being more favourable for them when liberalization is global.
Wadhwa (chapter III) examines some of the important aspects of intraregional
trade in South Asia as countries of that subregion are members of multiple preferential
regional and bilateral trade agreements. The paper tracks the trends and patterns in South
Asian  intraregional  trade, the comparative  advantages  of  major countries  in  the
subregion, trade complementarity between those countries, and the levels and product
coverage  of  intra-industry  trade  over  the past decade.  The  paper  shows  that  trade
complementarities among the South Asian countries, although still low, have improved
over time. In addition, the levels of intra-industry trade in this subregion are not  yet
significant. Nonetheless, the analysis of marginal intra-industry trade indicates that there
are a few product categories that have contributed significantly to the new trade flows
over the past decade. The region does have the potential for enhancing intraregional trade
in at least some sectors through vertical intra-industry trade among the member countries,
with India taking the lead in this regard.
While trade  agreements focus  on the creation  of additional market  access  (in
addition  to  the  one  obtained  through  WTO  and  unilateral  preferential  schemes),  the
byproduct  is  also  generation  of trade  diversion  for  countries  not  involved  in  the8
agreements. Raihan (chapter IV) investigates the impact of trade liberalization between
India and the European Union on low-income countries that currently enjoy preferences
in the European Union market relative to India. All the low-income economies under
consideration would experience a loss in welfare, and the welfare losses for the South
Asian countries would be much higher than for the other low-income economies in Asia
and  Africa.  Bangladesh  appears  to  experience the largest  loss  in  welfare  in  absolute
value, whereas the rest of South Asia would incur the largest loss in terms of share in
GDP. The welfare losses of these low-income economies are mainly driven by the loss in
terms of trade. However, in general, the extent of welfare loss in terms of share in GDP
for most of these countries is not very high. Most of these low-income countries would
also experience losses in real GDP and exports. The policy issue to be considered here is
whether rules  of  origin  that  exist  in  agreements  between  India  and  (most  of  the
considered) low-income countries, and between India and the European Union, could be
designed in such a way as to prevent these adverse terms of trade shocks.
While most of the trade growth for dynamic Asian economies has occurred in the
merchandise and manufacturing sectors, services is an important sector; however, the
latter sector is often overlooked as the driver of growth. Traditionally, services have been
seen  as  a  low  productivity  growth  sector;  however,  with the  recent advancement  of
information and communication technology (ITC) as a medium for delivering services,
the services sector is playing a dominant role in increasing productivity of other sectors,
services and goods alike. Another special feature of services trade is the type of barriers
used. In contrast to trade in goods, services trade is regulated mostly by “behind the
border” measures  that  belong  to  regulatory  and  liberalization  frameworks  and  it is
complicated to implement these measures on a discriminatory basis.
Nevertheless, as an increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements
include concessions in the services sector, Dee (chapter V) explores what behind-the-
border reforms in services and investment are best done through trade agreements. One
way  to  answer  this  question  is  to  think  of  trade  agreements  as  being  exercises  in
piecemeal  reform,  in  the  sense  that  they  provide  opportunities  for  reform,  but  in  a
constrained,  partial  manner.  The  key  policy  question  is  whether  countries  should
unreservedly take advantage of these opportunities, despite the constraints, or whether the
nature  of  the  constraints  should  temper  the  way  in  which  the  countries  go  about  the
reforms. Chapter IV first compares trade agreements, as exercises in piecemeal reform,
with other modes of liberalization, and then considers which particular reforms should be
included  in  trade  agreements.  It  develops  two  key  principles  of  piecemeal  reform  in
services and investment. The first is to look for sectors where trade barriers tend to add to
real  resource  costs. The second is to take  a broader view than that of just removing
discrimination  against  foreign  providers.  The  paper  concludes  with  some  general
guidance for trade negotiators and trade ministers.
E. Some aspects of regional financial integration in Asia and the Pacific
In examining the key factors leading to the collapse of trade with the last crisis in
2008, Baldwin (ed., 2009) finds that “global trade finance has not had a major impact on
trade flows”. The freezing of trade finance did not happen in all regions and, in general,10
from the region tend to invest in markets outside Asia, and some commentators argue that
this weak linkage between financial markets in the United States/Europe and Asia has
saved Asia from the adverse effects of the sub-prime mortgage crisis. While the low level
of integration with the global financial markets might serve as insurance in circumstances
such as this latest crisis, economies in Asia and the Pacific still need to improve their
financial markets by connecting them both with the world and intraregionally.
Two chapters in this volume look at different aspects of portfolio investments.
Daly and Mishra (chapter VII) analyse the linkage between the geographical patterns of
trade and portfolio investment. They do so by studying the case of Australia. They use
the International Monetary Fund’s coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey dataset. After
finding that the pattern of Australia’s capital flows does not match that of its trade flows,
they  investigate  the  possible  reasons  for  the  mismatch,  including  the  role  of  cultural
informational factors as well as the role of regulatory and legal variables. Their results
suggest that the major determinants of Australia’s geographical allocation of portfolio
investment  indicate  a  broad  correspondence  between  stock  market  capitalization  of
destination countries and the allocation of Australian financial investments – although
with  some  deviations  from  the  baseline,  where  the  deviations  are  correlated  with
Australian  trade  patterns.  Australia’s  disproportionate investment flows  with their
concentration on a few countries, in contrast to that country’s pattern of trade flows, can
be attributable to an extension of the home bias puzzle that has been observed by many
researchers.
Donnelly and Tower (chapter VIII) attempt to see which practices might have
acted, or remain, as additional barriers to enhancing intra-Asian financial integration as
well as integration between Asia and the most developed markets of United States and
Europe. Historically, United States mutual funds have often calculated their asset values
for international mutual funds using stale prices, because some fund components finish
trading before the market close, thus causing daily fund returns to be predictable. This, in
turn, allows an arbitrage opportunity for investors who move their money at the end of
the  trading  day in  the  United  States to  capture  the  next-day  change  in  Asian  and
European equities.  This acts as a tax on other investors in mutual funds that hold non-
United  States  assets.  The  paper quantitatively  traces  the  history  of  this  phenomenon,
known  as  time-zone  arbitrage,  in  various  mutual  funds,  both  before  and  after  the
phenomenon  became  well  known.  The  opportunity  for time-zone  arbitrage  has
diminished but not disappeared. This shrinkage, together with the advent of Exchange-
Traded Funds, which are not subject to time-zone arbitrage, make investment in Asia and
Europe more profitable for American mutual fund investors. This should increase United
States investment in Asia and Europe and enhance the integration of these markets.11
F.Implications
It appears that after the initial dramatic reaction to the recent crisis, trade flows of
Asia-Pacific economies have stabilized and turned towards recovery. While the recovery
of  trade has  been  faster  than initially predicted, policymakers  should  not become
complacent about the situation.  It is obvious that corrections need to be made in the
global  imbalances  in  trade,  savings  and  investments.  This,  in  turn,  will require
repositioning  by the Asia-Pacific region in terms of growth strategies. A complementary
source of growth to demand in the developed country markets must be found; for many
countries,  domestic  aggregate  demand  will  not  be  strong  enough  to  support the
continuation of high growth rates over the longer period needed for a sustained fight
against poverty.
From the analysis provided in this volume’s chapters, efforts to improve trade and
financial  liberalization  in  the  Asian  and  Pacific  region  must  be  strengthened.  Trade
liberalization, so far pursued through multiple preferential trade agreements, should be
tackled in a more systematic way in order to prevent adverse “noodle bowl” effects. Even
so, not all countries in the region will necessarily benefit if trade integration is just left to
the  elimination  of  tariffs.  Deeper  integration  that enables  formation  of  regional
production  networks  is  necessary.  This will not be possible  without  improving the
mobility of capital and labour in the region and creating greater transparency of “behind
the  border”  barriers. Integration  in  real  sectors  must  be  balanced  with  financial
integration. While movements in FDI have become more synchronized with trade flows,
portfolio  capital  movements  and  development  of  bond  markets  are  lagging  behind.
Improving  the  flow  of  goods,  services,  capital  and  people  within  the  Asian  and  the
Pacific region will produce benefits but should not be done at the cost of severing links
between Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world.12
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